Introduction
Cooperation is a fundamental human behavior (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Boyd & Mathew, 2007; Clutton-Brock, 2009; Dugatkin, 1997; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Hill, 2002; Kaplan, Hill, Lancaster, & Hurtado, 2000; Trivers, 1971) with the potential to improve individual wealth, but it remains a fragile strategy. Individuals who do not contribute but who exploit public goods fare better than those who contribute and pay costs; defectors who are called free-riders therefore obtain a greater payoff. If strategies that are more successful spread, then cooperation will vanish from the population, and public goods will simultaneously disappear. This propagation of the defectors' behavior can drive a population into a "tragedy of the commons" (Hardin, 1968) . Thus, clarifying the mechanisms underlying this cooperation dilemma in society is of great importance to many fields of research.
Some prior reports describe how costly punishment might yield a solution to the problem of the cooperation dilemma (Boyd, Gintis, & Bowles, 2003; Boyd & Richerson, 1992; Brandt, Hauert & Sigmund, 2006; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Fowler, 2005; Hauert, Traulsen, Brandt, Sigmund, & Nowak, 2007; Ostrom, Walker, & Gardner, 1992; Rand, Dreber, Ellingsen, Fudenberg, & Nowak, 2009; Rockenbach & Milinski, 2006; Sigmund, Silva, Traulsen, & Hauert, 2010; Sigmund & Hauert, 2001; Silva, Hauert, Traulsen, & Sigmund, 2010; Yamagishi, 1986) . A stable cooperative society, however, does not form from only the three strategies of cooperators, defectors, and pool-punishers, as shown in Appendix I with a stochastic model. Cooperators contribute but do not punish. Defectors do not contribute to the public good but exploit the contributions of the other participants. Pool-punishers contribute to the public good and punish all participants who do not contribute to the punishment mechanism. When one punisher invades a state occupied by defectors, he gains a meager payoff from public goods but must contribute to both public goods and the punishment pool. In contrast, although the defectors receive dispersed punishment by the punisher, they gain their payoff from public goods. Therefore, the defector payoff is greater than that of the punisher: the punisher cannot invade the state which the defectors occupy. Consequently, a cooperative society does not form.
Some previous studies (Brandt et al., 2006; Hauert et al., 2007; Silva et al., 2010 ) developed a voluntary public goods game based on the average payoffs and gave the necessary conditions for natural selection to favor the emergence of cooperation in finite populations. Sigmund et al. also reported that poolpunishers will invade and take over with the four strategies of cooperation, defection, pool-punishment, and loner (Sigmund et 佐野 充他：強制参加公共財ゲームにおいて個別学習を通して協力的なプール罰戦略がフリーライダー戦略に勝利する al., 2010) . These studies rely on the assumptions that players can decide voluntarily whether to participate in the joint enterprise and that loners who do not participate can obtain an income independently of the other players' decisions. But, the loners live alone, getting no payoffs from anyone else. They incur a cost for choosing to be alone. The assumption is therefore illogical. Accordingly, the payoff of the loner can be lower than that of the community in which all residents are defectors, where a cooperative society does not emerge.
Problem and Purpose
Now we must point out a severe problem in these studies based on the average payoffs. Estimating the average values requires sufficient knowledge of the payoffs for all players in all PGGs. Such omniscience is clearly difficult to achieve in practice. People make estimates every day based on insufficient knowledge.
Players, therefore, make their decisions based on the payoffs received in games played before. Here we examine in compulsory PGGs how pool-punishers overcome defectors in societies comprising those following the three strategies of cooperation, defection, and pool-punishment through individual learning using knowledge of the payoffs from previous encounters, not based on the average payoffs.
Model and method
In the compulsory PGG considered here, M denotes the popu- The PGG continues until all M individuals in a generation have played. Individual learning is executed as follows. Two players, i and j, who act respectively as a student and a teacher, are chosen randomly. Student i adopts the strategy of teacher j with probability 1
for s → ∞, where payoffs are obtained from previous games (Blume, 1993; McFadden, 1981; Sigmund et al., 2010; Szabo & Toke, 1998; Traulsen, Nowak, & Pacheco, 2006) . This process is repeated for two or more episodes of learning. Once the learning is completed, the strategies are changed according to the probabilities. The strategy of a randomly chosen player is changed by mutation. Each generation is established in this way. Evolution proceeds over many generations.
Results and discussion
The appearance of a pool-punisher in a state occupied by defectors is considered. Two combinations in PGGs are considered. Moreover, pool-punishers prevail in the four-strategy case that includes peer-punishers in addition to these other three strategies. The constraint B > c + G means that the defector's punishment is greater than the pool-punisher's cost. This inequality corresponds to a social rule within a policing system whereby the authorities impose an additional penalty on a tax cheat. Our society accepts this restriction as a rational rule.
We should note the following point when a pool-punisher appears in a state occupied by defectors. In a case where a single pool-punisher overcomes N -1 defectors, the cost G is converted to the total punishment B(N -1). This conversion equates to a high-performance punishment mechanism. Examples of such practices might be found in primitive religions, white magic, oracles, shamanism, and social norms (Benson, 1989; Eliade, 1972; Malinowski, 1961; Weber, 1976; Sugiyama, 1991) . However, further research is necessary to clarify this situation.
The long-term frequencies of the three strategies can be exam- demonstrates that establishing a cooperative society depends on the participation ratio. This result agrees well with a sociologist's observation (Olson, 1965; Putnam, 1993) . In contrast, prior works based on the average payoffs reported that establishing a cooperative society is independent of the participation rate, which is inconsistent with the observation.
We next specifically examine the probability of fixation when moving from a state with a single pool-punisher and M -1 defectors to a state with M pool-punishers under the condition B > c + G. This relates to the time period for establishing a cooperative society.
In a case with one individual learning episode per generation, reported that the fixation probability Here, P is expressed by the matrix at the bottom of this page:
Calculating the values of α k and β k requires knowledge of the order of the magnitudes of the pool-punisher's payoffs P V and the defector's payoffs P Y . Although the values are dependent on the parameters c, r, G, and B, their order is the following:
Here, P YN-1 and P V1 respectively denote the defector's and poolpunisher's payoffs obtained by N -1 defectors and a single pool-punisher in their PGG For N = 5, r = 3, c = 1, G = 0.5, and B = 1.6, the magnitudes have the following order:
We can thereby obtain the following equations:
. 
For the case in which N = 5, r = 1.1, c = 1, G = 0.5, and B = 1.6, the order of the magnitudes is
and we can thereby obtain the following equations: Table 1 presents results for a case with a low mutation rate and two episodes of individual learning during one generation.
Fixation probabilities decrease concomitantly with increased M and decreased N, i.e., the fixation probability decreases with a decrease in the participation rate in PGG. A probability of 0.001 is obtained for five participants in a population of 40 individuals. The emergence of a cooperative society requires that, on average, one pool-punisher arises per 1,000 events. Because pool-punishers appear repeatedly by mutation and because the cooperative society is stable once it has been established, this value is not regarded as unrealistic. Dunbar reported that establishing a stable cooperative society required 30-50 participants in a population of about 150 individuals (Dunbar, 1993 ).
In the current case, the calculated probabilities are 0.03-0.18, which easily establishes cooperation.
(2) It is noteworthy that the calculated probabilities are greater when the population size is smaller and the participation rate is higher. The observation of larger probabilities in smaller groups agrees with sociological findings (Olson, 1965) . Our results are also consistent with Putnam's observation that the participation rate is highly correlated with the emergence of cooperation (Putnam, 1993) . Notably, the mutation rate is related to the emergence of a pool-punisher in a defector's society. Higher values shorten the period necessary to establish a cooperative society. Moreover, if pool-punishers or cooperators who appear by mutation in a defector's society are not chosen as students in the learning, they persist in the succeeding generation, leading to a higher probability than that calculated here and relaxing the requirement that B > c + G.
Conclusion
Through individual learning, we examined how pool-punishers overcome defectors to establish stable cooperation within a society without help from either non-participants or players using other strategies. The main results are presented below. A poolpunisher can establish stable cooperation easily in a society, provided that the defector's punishment is greater than the poolpunisher's cost, which is consistent with our social rules. Higher fixation probabilities were found to be obtained with a smaller population size and a higher participation rate. This study shed Table 1 : Fixation probabilities moving from a single pool-punisher to all pool-punishers with two episodes of individual learning during a generation. The probability shows that a smaller population and a higher participation rate higher values. The other parameters; r = 3; c = 1; G = 0.5; B = 1.6. 2x10 -5 2x10 -6 3x10 -7 4x10 -8 5x10 -9 7x10 -10 light on the processes of self-organization in human societies.
Our future research will examine under what conditions cooperation can be established by pool-punishers through individual learning even in the presents of anti-social punishment.
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Stationary distributions with average payoffs in social learning:
The model PGG comprises a finite population of players with the three strategies of cooperation, defection, and pool-punishment (Sigmund et al., 2010) . Public goods are distributed based on altruism. Cooperators contribute to public goods but not to the punishment-pool, which is used to penalize free-riders and second-order free-riders. As a consequence of overlooking the free-riding, cooperators receive a second-order penalty from an agent of the punishment-pool (such as a police officer) delegated by its members.
Defectors contribute to neither public goods nor the punishment-pool. Moreover, they receive a penalty because of their free-riding.
Pool-punishers contribute both to the public goods and to the punishment-pool used to penalize both cooperators and defectors. The numbers of cooperators, defectors, and pool-punishers are denoted X, Y, and V (M = X + Y + V). Random samples of N individuals play the PGG, and x, y, and v respectively denote the quantities of the X, Y, and V participants in a game (N = x + y + v). The average payoffs for the players follow those reported elsewhere in the literature (Sigmund et al., (2010) , specifically,
For a small probability of mutation μ, the embedded Markov chain describing the transitions between All X , All Y , and All V is given as shown below. ). The population is dependent upon an initial distribution with coexisting defectors and pool-punishers. For the three strategies, a cooperative society was not established. Table 1d : Fixation probabilities moving from a single pool-punisher to all pool-punishers with five episodes of individual learning during one generation. The other parameters were r = 3, c = 1, G = 0.5 and B = 1.6. 
